How did the outcome of the Greco-Persian Wars affect the relations between the Greek City-States of Athens and Sparta between 479 bce and 431 bce?

An Essay Exploring how Athens and Sparta went from allies in 479 to war in 431 bce.

Contents:

Abstract

The Persian Wars, lasting from 499-479 was “the first battle for the west” is an incredible underdog story of a small backwater fighting off the global hegemon and has been mythicised for modern ears by the likes of Hollywood with films like the 300. The effect it had on the Ancient Greek world, and today’s world is incalculable. However, the lesser known Peloponnesian War which succeeded it in scope, size and savagery had an even greater impact as it ultimately leads to Alexander the Great and then the Roman Empire. This essay will explore just how the Greco-Persian Wars changed Athens into a negligible, second-rate Polis to an empire and how the relationships between Athens and Sparta, the other Greek Hegemon of the period, changed in a short, but very significant period that would bring the two great power blocs of the Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues to clash heads and ultimately economically ruin the Greek World for 100 years. As all dates are BCE, I will simply refer to dates when required without the suffix. 

Introduction

The Pentecontaetia, as first coined by Thucydides meaning “The Period of Fifty Years”, describes the period between the end of the Greco-Persian Wars in 479 and the beginning of the Great Peloponnesian War in 431 and is one of the most important periods, perhaps in all of history.

   The Peloponnesian War has often, and rightly so, been compared to that of World War One by many 20th and 21st century Ancient Historians. This comparison seemingly comes from the fact that, despite the Spartan fear of Athens, neither state particularly wanted to go to war and both seemingly found themselves stumbling into a conflict thanks to alliances and lack of diplomacy that was very capable of preventing the war. Following the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War however, the war turned into a violent and savage one, unlike any seen before – exactly like World War One. So too was the Greek War a ‘World War’ as each state involved seemed to be waging total war against the other – all policies and funding during this period went to financing the war on both sides – and, at least to the Greeks at the time, the entire world was involved and had a stake in the Wars outcome – from Carthage to Persia. The similarities between the Greek world and the 20th century do not end there however, as many historians have not been afraid to compare the period between the Greco-Persian and Peloponnesian Wars to the ‘Cold War’ between the USA and USSR following the Second World War.  This can perhaps, especially given the last centuries events, explain why the Pentecontaetia and Peloponnesian Wars have jumped back into many people’s consciousness; beyond the realms of dusty textbooks in University libraries. The Peloponnesian War was a total, world war that had catastrophic repercussions on history; certainly for the next few centuries, and beyond.  

   Thucydides wrote that the Peloponnesian War began due to Spartan fears over increases in Athenian Imperialism and Power, and much contention has been raised over the validity of this view, as this essay will discuss. Other reasons raised by various historians going to war are as follows: Other member states in the Peloponnesian League like Thebes, Corinth and Megara pushing Sparta towards war and the ostracism of the pro-Spartan Athenian, Cimon. These three reasons, as this essay will show are the leading causes as to why Sparta and Athens were pushed towards war as they were.   

   This essay will discuss the reasons why the two states went to war as they did, exploring how Athenian Imperialism and the Peloponnesian Response to it brought the states from allies to enemies by 445 and how the events following eventually dragged the two states to war, despite a lack of trying to prevent it on both sides. Despite the many contrary conclusions and views provided by many historians across millennia, the vast majority agrees that the evidence points towards the Thucydidean theorem to be correct, that it was indeed Spartan fears of Athenian Imperialism (Whether or not there actually was any threat) that brought the states to being enemies, whilst secondary states in the Peloponnesian League like Thebes and Megara attempted to push the states to war as to use it as a means to an end. 

Chapter 1: Athenian Imperialism

The Delian League was formed in 478, one year after the Greco-Persian Wars and ‘it began as an association of the Athenians and their allies’ (Kagan, 2003). Following the Spartan (And the entire Peloponnesian League alongside it, therefore pulling states like Corinth, who were also very powerful regions, out of the alliance) withdrawal from the fight against Persia, formally ending the Greco-Persian Wars (See Appendix 3), the Athenians became the dominant power in the Alliance. It essentially allowed them to portray themselves as the liberators of Greece, and the only state who could actively protect the small islands of the Aegean and Ionian Polis’ on Asia Minor. Each state in the Delian League would pay “Tribute” into a collective fund for fighting the Persians on the Island of Delos. As Holland claims; ‘An alliance was legally constituted… The Ionians, the islanders, the Greeks of the Hellespont: almost all signed up.’ (Holland 2005) .

   However, there is great controversy over why Sparta left the Persian push-back solely to the Athenians, thus allowing them to essentially craft sole influence over the Aegean and Eastern Greece; especially considering the fact that one of the reasons Pausanias (See Appendix 3; Battle of Plataea) was able to convince his fellow Spartans to continuing to push the Persians out of Greece was due to the promise of greater lands and riches through states in the Aegean joining the League. As Hornblower says; ‘it all seems to easy’ (Hornblower, 2011) to put it, as Thucydides claims, the loss of hegemony, was yielded gracefully. Hornblower provides the convincing argument, reiterating that of Herodotus; that it was the ‘insufferable behaviour of Pausanias (Thucydides agrees here, saying that Pausanias’ command ‘resembled a tyranny rather than a military command.’ He would later be assassinated) was a pretext which enabled the Athenians to ‘snatch the hegemony’ from the Spartans’ (Hornblower, 2011).  Certainly, too there seemed to be argument within Sparta itself of caution. Hetoimaridas ‘warned that it was not in Sparta’s interests to bid for control of the sea.’ Once Sparta had left the Hellenic Alliance and the entire Peloponnesian League with it, Athens became the only state powerful enough of note within the alliance, thus essentially allowing them free reign to craft influence in the Aegean and beyond. 

   Throughout the 470s and the 460s, the Athenians continued their pursuit against the Persian giant. These campaigns were mainly lead by a man named Cimon, who was the preeminent statesman of the era – much like Pericles (See Appendix 4) would be during the end of the Pentecontaetia. Reportedly, Cimon would win a stunning back-to-back victory in Asia minor, ‘It was this battle, once and for all, that destroyed any lingering prospect of a third Persian invasion’. (Holland 2005). Following this however, Holland claims that Athens ‘appeared to shrink from a sense of her own achievement: as though she could not bear to abandon a struggle that had served for thirty long years to define her. So that Persia, in the prayers offered up by the assembly, continued to be named as the national enemy.’ (Holland 2005). This seems a more palatable explanation as to why the Athenians turned their League into an Empire than that the Athenians just became drunk on power. During the 460s, they even sent troops to the revolting Egypt, to help the country make itself independent from Persia. It is following this disaster, where the Athenians are given the chance to formalise their Empire. Holland claims that, following the disaster in Egypt ‘The Athenians, in a panic that the barbarians might now come sweeping back into the Aegean, hurriedly removed the headquarters of the league from Delos to their own city.’ (Holland 2005). However it seems likely that another motive was the ones above explained, further helped by Holland’s later admittance that Even when the Persians failed to materialise in Greek waters, the treasury remained on the Acropolis’. 

   Here it seems that the threat of Persian invasion was the excuse rather than the cause to place the treasury on the Acropolis rather than the island of Delos. The Athenians were struck, ever since by the Battle of Marathon by a sense of belief in themselves, almost like exceptionalism. By the 460s, the Athenians had the biggest navy and economy in all of Greece; it seems foolish to think that they would not have thought themselves able to defeat Persia a second time – especially in its currently weakened state. Evidence for this can be seen in Athenian propaganda – ideas that the Persians fought like women were common, and many clay Pithos made by Athens about the Greco-Persian Wars during this time depicted the Persians wearing dresses;  ‘…a dramatic reconstruction of Xerxes’ return home from Salamis. The King who had left Persia in the full pomp of his majesty was portrayed limping back in rags; the courtiers who had thought to hail a conquering hero were heard wailing in misery’ (Holland 2005) in one play by Sophocles. This shows just how far the Athenians were willing to go in order to maintain balance within the Greek world. By the 460s, the Athenians had begun to refer to the other members of the Delian League, not as allies but as ‘subjects’ (Holland 2005).

   The Peace of Callias is evidence enough of Athens’ imperialistic ambitions. In 449, the Athenian diplomat Callias met with the Persians and a deal was struck whereby the Persians agreed not to invade Greek lands, and the Athenians would do the same. Such a diplomatic victory cannot be understated – the Athenians, a tiny insignificant state making favourable terms with the world’s first superpower is a feat. However its significance comes from the fact that this peace largely made the Delian League redundant – if the Persian threat now no longer existed, why need a League to protect against it? No dissolution came from Athens, in fact they kept the peace a secret (So well kept was the secret, that there is extremely little evidence of any Peace occurring because of the Athenian cover-up, leading some historians to question is existence). If the Peace had not been kept secret, many states within the League would have seceded, already there was discontent among many of them as the Athenian ‘liberators’ began to look more like ‘oppressors’. Thasos, Mytilene and Byzantium were but to name a few already feeling these effects. The Athenians, now openly calling other members of the League ‘subjects’ could not risk the dissolution of the League, but also a war with the Peloponnese (If States began to leave the Delian League, and Athens attempted to stop them, there was a big chance Sparta would make a deal to protect them. As was seen in the Peloponnesian War itself. (See Appendix 4; Archidamian War; Paragraphs 7-8)

   Evidently, it is easily concluded that the actions of Athens prompt the term ‘imperialistic’ – from their forcing states to remain in the Delian League, and often attacking cities that tried to leave, extracting tribute from these states and building great works with them, the Parthenon being but one. By doing so, Athens began to meddle in the affairs of many powerful states: Corinth and Thebes particularly – which would have direct and important consequences during the build up to the Peloponnesian War; as these states would push Sparta towards war. Whilst these acts from Athens did not antagonise majority opinion in Sparta directly, but their later actions in interfering in the Peloponnese would do so, and would also help push Sparta towards war. Most historians agree that the actions of Athens ended up being imperialistic, and that they turned a League to protect against tyrannical foreign rule into an Empire with tyrannical domestic rule. The debate for historians comes on where exactly the honest intentions of Athens end and the Empire begins. However, this essay believes, while an Anti-Spartan, imperialistic faction was in Athens since the end of the Greco-Persian Wars, it really came to the fore and majority opinion following the destruction of Cimon’s regime, thus placing it at around 465.

   Chapter 2: The Peloponnesian Response 

Following the Persian Wars, the majority opinion in Sparta was a Pro-Athenian one. This primarily comes from the legacy of the Hellenic Alliance and the belief that Sparta had regained hegemony over Greece. However, an Anti-Athenian faction was ever-present in Sparta, and it is key to understanding why the states went to war as their power grew very quickly during this period. In the early years following the Persian Wars, Sparta recommended to Athens that they not rebuild their walls around the city. Kagan argues that ‘this came from ‘the rivalry (that) arose in the decades after the Persian Wars, as the (Delian) League grew in success, wealth and power and gradually manifested imperial ambitions’ (Kagan, 2003). The Athenians, unsurprisingly, declined; causing a debate in 475 where Sparta decided on whether to go to war – destroy the Athenian Empire and take control of the sea, but was rejected ‘after heated debate’ (Kagan, 2003). This Spartan faction remained an influential factor within the state, very nearly getting Sparta to invade Attica in 465 following an imperialistic Athenian  siege on Thasos – only being turned around by an earthquake (See Appendix 1; Sparta). The Anti-Athenian faction within Sparta were particularly popular with the citizenry as opposed to the two kings – Archidamnus was particularly averse to battle with Athens – and thus; in the latter years of the Pentecontaetia were consistently elected to the Ephors (See Appendix 1; Sparta). 

    The earthquake in Sparta prompted a new Helot uprising (See Appendix 1; Sparta). The city frantically called its allies for help; the entire Peloponnesian League answered the call. So did Athens; still technically allied with Sparta (Cimon’s Pro-Sparta faction dominated Athenian politics at the time, so despite their imperialistic motives and actions, Athens still saw themselves as a staunch ally of Sparta). The Spartans immediately dismissed them; allowing the Anti-Spartan faction within Athens to bring Cimon’s regime down and ostracise the son of the hero of Marathon (See Appendix 3; Marathon).  Most historians agree with the Thucydidean view here that ‘The Spartans were afraid of the boldness and revolutionary spirit of the Athenians, thinking that… if they remained (the Athenians) might be persuaded…to change sides… it was because of this expedition that the Spartans and Athenians first came to an open quarrel’ (Thucydides,1972). This act from the Spartans caused shockwaves across the entire Greek world and its significance cannot be understated. The above described fall of Cimon’s regime lead to the formalisation of the two power blocs in Greece – essentially setting precedent for the great war to come; emphasised by the fact the overwhelming majority in the Athenian assembly became one of hatred over the Spartans. The short-term impact of this is the official Athenian withdrawal from the old Spartan alliance, and the creation of a new alliance with their old enemy – Argos. This one act by the Spartans, that was by all means a reaction to the Athenian Imperialist ambitions, was key to the escalation between the two powers. A seemingly insignificant act’s consequences developed into a wave, that sent the two states hurtling to war.  This is why many historians, this essay included concur that it’s significance as to why the two states eventually went to war in 431 is huge, due it being the foundation stone that many of the causes of the war were built up from. 

   Another factor that helped the states go to war in 431 was its preceding war – The First Peloponnesian War 460-445 (The reason the First Peloponnesian War lasted so long was primarily because of the Proxy fighting that occurred on-and-off. Unlike the Great Peloponnesian War of 431-404 where at least one major battle would occur a year, fighting was on-and-off during its preceding conflict. Another reason is due to Megara’s joining Athens, Sparta no longer had a safe passage out of the Peloponnese to attack Athens. The one time Athens and Sparta did fight in this war was following Megara rejoining the Peloponnesian League, allowing a huge Peloponnesian army to march into Attica, tie down the Athenians to a single pitched battle and win the day, as was the tradition for Greek warfare). This war has largely been forgotten by history, overshadowed by the Persian and (First/Great) Peloponnesian War primarily because the two major players in the Greek world, Athens and Sparta, only ever fought one battle against each other. The rest of this 15 year conflict came from proxy wars – primarily between Corinth and Megara but including states like Thebes and Athens (Sparta would only fight one battle, against Athens however Athens did fight many other states including Thebes and Corinth). The war started over a border dispute between Megara and Corinth, ultimately leading to Megara leaving the Peloponnesian League and joining Athens after they began to lose and Sparta refused to help either side. The fact Megara did so set precedent for the next 50 years of lesser-power Greek politics; as Kagan says: so long as the two hegemonial powers were on good terms, each was free to deal with its allies as it wished; dissatisfied members had no recourse for their grievances. Now however, dissident states could seek support from their leaders rival.’ (Kagan, 2003) . This kind of politics from the less-powerful states in Greece would be emulated over the next few decades, particularly with the issue over Corcyra and Epidamnus. Following the Megarian defect from the Delian League, and rejoin of the Peloponnesian League, Sparta was able to march into Attica – in which ‘a decisive battle seemed certain’ (Kagan, 2003). However they turned around and went back to Lacedaemon before this could happen – likely because Pericles had offered acceptable peace terms. 

   The First Peloponnesian War is an enigma in Greek History, seemingly because it seems more at home in a 20th century, Cold War context than an Ancient one. Still, it showed that the two powerhouses of the Greek world were, while reluctant, willing to go to war with each other – allowing opportunists to help justify the decisions for war in 431. So too, it certainly soured relations between the two states, allowing the Anti-factions in each state to ‘prove’ they were right about the other side. The majority consensus in each city would be of a more aggressive than peaceful stance when it came to the other side too. More importantly that affected the relations was the Spartan snub of the Athenians, for it formalised the power blocs and ruined any chance of a pro-Spartan faction being popular among the people of Athens – emphasised by Cimon’s ostracism.

   Chapter 3: The Road To War

   Following the Athenian defeat, Spartan terms on Athens were incredibly lenient. Athens was required to give up all Peloponnesian Lands they’d acquired, while Spartans ‘granted what amounted to official recognition of the Athenian Empire.’ (Kagan, 2003). The treaty also required that no states in either of the Leagues were allowed to defect to the opposing side, as Megara had done, but it allowed neutral states to join either side at any time. Kagan argues such a peace was one whereby both sides intended to keep it as opposed to one like the Treaty of Versailles which left the loser embittered. However the peace ran into trouble almost immediately. Corinth was still angry towards Athens due to its interfering in the war between herself and Megara- which Thucydides calls the ‘sphodron misos’. Thebes and Megara had also been taken over by Oligarchs deeply hostile to Athens – the latter going so far as to massacre an Athenian garrison in the city. Indeed in Sparta itself, there were many who resented sharing hegemony with the Athenians, which would soon be voted into power. These new faction-controlled cities across the Peloponnesian League would continually pressure to the  Peloponnesian leader, primarily to advance their own aims through various disasters and disputes as the pretext to pushing the Spartans to war.

   The Megarian Decree was one of the most important actions from the Athenians during this period in pushing the two power blocs towards war. The Athenians barred any Megarians from the harbours of the Athenian Empire – the entirety of the Aegean. Thucydides and most modern scholars argue that this embargo was an act of economic imperialism – intended as a deliberate provocation of war against the Peloponnesian League. This however makes little sense due to Pericles’ strategy of wanting to maintain the 30 Years Peace, Kagan’s argument that it was merely to prevent the spread of the war with Corinth to the rest of the Peloponnesus, and ‘ensuring that Megara was punished for its behaviour at Leucimne and Sybota.’ (Kagan, 2003).

   The dispute between Epidamnus and Corcyra was also one of the most important conflicts in the Pentecontaetia, and one that would continue throughout the Peloponnesian War. In 436, a civil war had driven the aristocratic faction out of Epidamnus. This group turned to Corcyra for help, who refused; before turning to Corinth (In return for the help, Epidamnus would become a Corinthian colony) – who eagerly accepted. The fact they did so is important due to the fact that Corcyra was founded by Corinth, however ‘relations (between the two) were uniquely bad. For centuries the two cities had quarreled and fought a series of wars, often over control of some colony that both claimed.’ (Kagan, 2003). In response, the Corcyrans appealed to Athens, who gladly sent help. Despite the Corinthians best efforts to stop the Athenians interfering, the 10 ships sent were quickly increased. Much debate has been raised as to why exactly the Athenians interfered, but Kagan’s argument certainly seems to be the most likely: If Corcyra was defeated then ‘the transfer of its navy would have created a Peloponnesian fleet strong enough to challenge Athenian naval supremacy’ (Kagan, 2003) which was key to maintaining the Empire. Despite this, the force ‘of ten ships was given specific instructions not to break the Thirty Years Peace (Hornblower,2011). Rather than proving that the Athenians did not wish for war because of any friendship with Sparta (though there certainly was an element of this among the political elite that associated themselves with Pericles), it shows that the Athenians were averse to war because of an unreadiness, or a belief that they would have been unable to beat the Spartans. 

   While the Athenian intentions on both of these seemed to be one of defence rather than aggression, and that those in charge of Athenian policy seemed averse to war; to those states affected – primarily Corinth and Megara – Athens was turning its imperial ambitions towards them. The two states, along with Thebes (Who wished for Sparta to go to war due to its own, mainly territorial ambitions that involved Plataea – given to Athens because of Thebes’ role in the Persian Wars) began to collude, to attempt to push Sparta to war. Indeed, a debate was even held in Sparta, including the entire Peloponnesian League (See Appendix 1; Peloponnesian League) as to how to deal with Athens and the solution of war was a recurring suggestion from many in Sparta as well as the delegations from the aforementioned cities. 

   The final factor that Thucydides mentions as to the catalysts that sent the two states to war is via a small city state in Chalcedon called Potidaea (See Appendix 2; Map 1). After it seceded from the Delian League, Athens once again put another state to siege. However, Potidaea had quietly made an alliance with Sparta – the latter promising to defend the city if they were attacked by Athens. When Athens did just so, there were many in Sparta who wanted to go to war. Here, it seems akin to a British promise to Poland in 1939 – never expecting the other side to actually commit and turn a promise into a practical reality, so many within Sparta were uneasy about war with Athens. Still, debate raged within the city as to whether to go to war. 

   The aggravation of Sparta’s primary allies (Those who joined the Peloponnesian League by choice as opposed to war) was a huge factor as to pushing Sparta to war. Particularly Corinth, as Hornblower argues that Corinth had long been the friend of Athens: a Corinthian called Periander had been ‘called on to arbitrate between Athens and Lesbos over the possession of Sigeion on the Hellespont, he awarded it to Athens.’ (Hornblower,2011) Other Corinthian arbitrations Hornblower cites is one concerning Plataea. Furthermore, he cites that ‘it was a Corinthian, who in the late sixth century, made a speech… which saved Athens from invasion by Spartans who wanted to reinstate the Pisistratid tyrant Hippias.’ (Hornblower,2011) The fact that Corinth the third most powerful state in Greece at the time and perhaps the only state that could have alone stopped Sparta going to war was pushing their Peloponnesian allies into war, shows how big of a factor this was. Sparta’s allies wanted war, and they needed to address it. The meeting with the Peloponnesian League shows what kind of a state the Greek world was in; it seemed as though every state a part from the big two were pushing for war – pushing both states towards the cliff as the political elites of each attempted to desperately stop what was happening. 

Chapter 4: Hope of a peace?

The primary hope for a peace came from the fact the leading Athenian politician at the time, Pericles was friends with the Spartan King Archidamnus were friends, showing that while the masses in each city were aggressive towards each other; many in the elite, especially at the very top, were friendly and hoping for peace. The Spartans called an Assembly with the Peloponnesian League. Kagan argues that both the Megarians and Corinthians, angry towards Athens pushed for war but that Corinth was most successful, persuading Sparta that ‘their traditional policy of prudence and reluctance to fight was disastrous’ (Kagan, 2003) and that they should come to the aid of Potidaea ‘lest you’, as Thucydides reports ‘betray your friends and kinsmen to their worst enemies and turn the rest of us to some other alliance’ (Thucydides, 1972) . Thucydides then reports that an Athenian Embassy who ‘happened to be present beforehand on other business’ (Thucydides, 1972) spoke to the Assembly, arguing that the Athenian Empire was one of necessity, and out of fear from an external threat – which the Peloponnesian League could well have empathised with considering their formation out of fear of Argos. Kagan argues that the reason why Pericles did not send an official Embassy to Sparta is because it would have suggested the Athenians knew they were breaking the 30 Years Peace, and would have ‘conceded Sparta’s right to judge Athenian behaviour’. Archidamnus next spoke to the assembly, and warned that a war with Athens would not be like the last Peloponnesian War, but that they ‘shall pass this war on to our children’ (Thucydides, 1972). He asked that the Spartans send an official complaint to Athens, whilst preparing for the proper kind of war they should have to fight – asking the Barbarians (namely Persians) for ships. This was ‘unwelcome’ (Kagan, 2003) to the rest of the League, and when the vote came; ‘a large majority voted that the Athenians had broken the peace; it was in effect, a vote for war.’

   However, there are those who question the real motives behind Sparta’s vote. Kagan claims it does not make sense, as the Spartans were not directly provoked and going into war could provide no tangible benefit. Thucydides, with his famous theory of the Spartan fear claims it occurred ‘because they were afraid that the Athenians might become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Greece was already in their hands… I think that the truest cause, but least spoken of, was the growth of Athenian power, which presented an object of fear to the Spartans and forced them to go war.’ Thucydides’ theory certainly seems to be feasible and it is the most accepted theory behind war of any, and it is the one that this essay accepts.

   However, despite the vote for war, the Peloponnesian League did nothing for a year, which Kagan says ‘seems to have been a sincere effort to avoid war’ as King Archidamnus still attempted to avoid war. The Spartans sent an embassy, proclaiming that ‘there would be no war if the Athenians withdrew the Megarian Decree’ (Thucydides, 1972 ). Pericles had consistently ignored Spartan embassies up to this point, even shutting off negotiations completely when the Spartans effectively voted for war, but to this he crafted his response for he was still very much against war with Sparta. Whilst this offer persuaded many in Athens, ‘who questioned the wisdom of the city’s going to war simply over the Megarian Decree’ (Kagan, 2003), Pericles remained firm that any negotiations must be done through arbitration, as the 30 years peace set out. 

   It is important to understand Pericles’ motives here, for they do not seem to make sense with his originally stated position. It seems as though, whilst he did not want war; he was prepared to accept it if necessary. His primary wish was to maintained Athenian dominance and not accept any kind of negotiation that undermined it. The impasse comes with this. Pericles did not believe Athens had broken the Peace, whereas Sparta (by voting to go to war under this belief) claimed they had. In short, Pericles wanted arbitration and the Spartans did not. 

   When Pericles replied to the embassy, justifying the decree, Sparta sent an ultimatum which Thucydides gives: ‘The Spartans want peace, and there will be peace if you give the Greeks their autonomy’( Thucydides, 1972) – which essentially amounts to the dissolution of the Empire. The Athenians, obviously, denied. And voted for war. 

   Historians argue that if the Athenians accepted the original Spartan request to withdraw the Megarian Decree, it would have kept the peace. Such a request alienated Corinth as they would not be allowed to defeat Corcyra in their conflict, leading to a rift within the Peloponnesian League and distracting the Spartans from Athenian affairs. But Pericles steadfastness to stick to the 30 Years Peace lead to the ultimatum from the Spartans, and a bloody 30 year war that would economically ruin the Greek world until Macedon. The hope for a peace was dashed, despite Archidamnus’ best efforts. 

Conclusion

So what is supposed to be understood from this 50 years of peace? This essay believes, as the common Greek fairy tale goes: Hubris leads to Nemesis. The Athenians became Hubristic, turning their League into their own personal Empire, extracting Tribute and attacking any of those who attempted to leave. They believed the victory against the Persians was their doing and theirs alone, allowing Patriotism turn into Nationalism. They began to interfere in the Spartan world, and aggravated her allies. The first Peloponnesian War was very much a war against Athens and Sparta’s allies, and solidified ideas that would come to enact revenge on them later, that Sparta’s Allies were determined to beat Athens by any means necessary. Corinth and Megara would, in the height of the Great Peloponnesian War, leave the Peloponnesian League and join the Argive League, all in an attempt to push Sparta back to war (See Appendix 4, Peace of Nicias and Sicilian Expedition). Athens, in their Hubris underestimated Sparta’s allies, and overestimated their position. Sparta meanwhile,simply wanted peace and to retain their status as the Greek Hegemon. Whilst they were fearful of Athens, it seems that their requests for peace were genuine. This essay has shown that, the victory over the Persians changed the Greek world forever and was a turning point in not just Greek history, but the history of the world. The resulting Pentecontaetia was one of the Greek states attempting to come accustomed to this new world, to poor effects. The Persian Wars would lead to the Peloponnesian War, due to the increased status of Athens – one that was now on par with Sparta. Neither side wanted to be equals and both saw themselves as the pre eminent state. The two power blocs that formed around them helped push the two to war. 

   The victory over the Persians also lead to a general increase in the wealth of city states, especially Athens. Within a few decades, Athens went from a second-rate city state, to the richest in the entire Greek world, with many trade routes now passing through its gate, being regulated by its laws, or generally being influenced by the city, with its ships patrolling the Aegean. Sparta maintained its wealth, and continued its dominance over the Peloponnesus, but beyond that its economic status did not change and the city stuck largely to the status quo. Athens, with their new economic might began to steal away the income of other cities, particularly Corinth and Megara – another reason as to why these two states were so adamant for war. Overall however, the Persian Wars had a overwhelmingly good effect on most states, especially Athens. 

   The relationships between city-states, especially between Sparta and Athens also changed. As a direct result of the Persian Wars, and the new Hubris of Athens, the two cities who were once close allies broke apart and became adversaries. Their rivalry would tear the Greek world apart. As Athens began to flex its new found might, Sparta became wary and fearful, and the masses in each city started to turn against each other. Whilst many in the political elite tried to maintain a peace, it seems that it was only a matter of time, thanks to Athens becoming an Empire to match, and sometimes out-match Sparta, that the two go to war.